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With ination aversion, an increase in the monetary growth rate decreases
the steady-state value of capital stock, consumption, and real balance holding.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In optimal growth models, positive time preferences, i.e. people sys-
tematically discount utility derived from future consumption, is taken for
granted [Olson and Bailey (1981)]. In addition, a further modeling of time
preferences by Uzawa (1968), where the time preference is an increasing
function of current utility, has been increasingly used in growth and as-
set accumulation models. See Obstfeld (1981), (1982) and (1989) among
others. While most economists do not question the existence of positive
* A very preliminary version of ination aversion in this paper was developed by
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time preference, they have raised some doubt about Uzawa's assumption.
For example, Blanchard and Fischer(1989) state that, for Uzawa's speci-
cation, \in steady state, a higher level of consumption implies a higher
rate of time preference. The assumption is dicult to defend a priori; in-
deed, we usually think it is the rich who are more likely to be patient. ...
The Uzawa function ... is not particularly attractive as a description of
preferences and is not recommended for general use" (pp.72-75).
Here in a monetary growth model, we attempt to establish a link between
the time preference and ination. We will demonstrate that, if there exists
positive time preference in the real world, ination is an important element
in determining its magnitude. The argument for dening the time prefer-
ence as an increasing function of ination is much stronger than for Uzawa's
specication. With this new denition of time discount rate, we will show
that ination reduces long-run capital accumulation, consumption and real
balance holdings.
2. ENDOGENOUS TIME PREFERENCE AND INFLATION
AVERSION
While the time preference depends on various factors in a society, ina-
tion is an important factor leading to social and economic instability and
disorder. Thus, it is convincing to dene the time preference, denoted as
, to be an increasing function of expected ination rate, denoted as .
Namely,  = (), 0()  0; and 00() < 0: Obviously enough we call this
denition as ination aversion. We rst present the theory of endogenous
time preference in Rae (1834), Bohm-Bawerk (1959), Fisher (1930), and
then argue why this denition is reasonable.
The time preference theory has its direct origin in Rae (1834) and Bohm-
Bawerk (1959); for this, Irving Fisher dedicated The Theory of Interest
(1930) in their memory. Rae calls the time preference as the eective
desire of accumulation, which has the following denition:
\The determination to sacrice a certain amount of present good, to ob-
tain another greater amount of good, at some future period, may be termed
the eective desire of accumulation. All men may be said to have a desire
of this sort, for all men prefer a greater to a less; but to be eective it must
prompt to action." (Rae, 1834, p.119)
What determines this eective desire of accumulation? Rae mainly lists
the following three elements: \1. The prevalence throughout the society,
of the social and benevolent aections... 2. The extent of the intellectual
powers, and the consequent prevalence of habits of reection, and prudence,
in the minds of the members of the society. 3. The stability of the condi-
tion of the aairs of the society, and the reign of law and order throughout
it."(Rae, 1834, New Principles of Political Economy, pp.124.) In this list,INFLATION AVERSION 3
Rae does not say anything about how does ination inuence the time pref-
erence. But it is quite clear from Rae's long discussion on \the social and
benevolent aection" and the desire of the social stability in the moral sense
that he admits the role of \ination aversion" in strengthening the eective
desire of accumulation in modern time.When he takes \the money-making
spirit" as the main element of the social aection and the instability of the
society, he says \(the love of ) money is the root of all evil, and infallibly
leads to wickedness", \these feelings, therefore, investing the concerns of
futurity with a lively interest to the individual, and giving a continuity to
the existence and projects of the race, must tend to strengthen very greatly
the eective desire of accumulation."
The time preference theory was fully developed by Eugen von Bohm-
Bawek. Indeed, Olson and Baily (1981) are right, \the clearest conception
of positive time preference that we have been able to nd was in Bohm-
Bawerk's original account." According to Bohm-Bawerk,
\we feel less concerned about future sensation of joy and sorrow simply
because they do lie in the future, and the lessening of our concern is in
proportion to the remoteness of that future. Consequently we accord to
goods which are intended to serve future ends a value which falls short of the
true intensity of their future marginal utility. We systematically undervalue
our future wants and also the means which serve to satisfy them. That is a
fact of that there can be no doubt." (Bohm-Bawerk, Capital and Interest,
Vol. II, p.268).
Bohm-Bawerk provides three causes for this positive time preference:
(1) \the fragmentary nature of the imaginary picture that we construct
of the future state of our wants" (p.269); (2) \a failure of will power and
lossing control over ourselves in facing immediate enjoyment"(p.269); and
(3) \consideration of the brevity and uncertainty of human life." (p.270)
The causes listed by Bohm-Bawerk in determining positive time pref-
erence manifest themselves fully in an inationary world. First, ination
leads to economic, social and institutional uncertainty, and causes \disil-
lusionment and discontent" (Arthur Burns) in the society and \strikes at
condence" (John Maynard Keynes) of the people. All those uncertainty
and anxiety, of course, result in more impatience and larger time discount
rate. We cite two excellent quotations of Keynes and Burns from Fabricant
(1976).
For John Maynard Keynes,
\There is no subtler, no sure means of overturning the existing basis of
society than to debauch the currency. The process engages all the hidden
forces of economic law on the side of destruction, and does it in a man-
ner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose ... [The] arbitrary
arrangement of riches [caused by ination] strikes not only at security but
at con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permanent relations between debtors and creditors, which form the ulti-
mate foundation of capitalism, become so utterly disordered as to be almost
meaningless; and the process of wealth-getting degenerates into a gamble
and a lottery." (Keynes, 1919, The Economic Consequences of the Peace,
pp. 235-248.)
Chairman Arthur Burns of the Federal Reserve Board warns \the menace
of ination":
\Concerned as we all are about the economic consequences of ination,
there is even greater reason for concern about the impact on our social and
political institution. We must not risk the social stress that persistent ina-
tion breeds. Because of its capricious eects on the income and wealth of a
nation's families and businesses, ination inevitably causes disillusionment
and discontent. ... Discontent bred by ination can provoke profoundly dis-
turbing social and political change, as the history of other nations teaches.
I do not believe I exaggerate in saying that the ultimate consequence of in-
ation could well be a signicant decline of economic and political freedom
for the American people."
Secondly, while high ination makes rational economic calculation more
dicult or impossible, it makes people possess even less \adequate power
to imagine and to abstract" the future world. This corresponds cause (1)
of positive time preference pointed out by Bohm-Bawerk. Indeed expected
high ination often leads people to perceive the future in dark color, and
people may enjoy more today at the sacrice of future consumption. This
weakness of human will in facing high ination results in large time discount
rate.
Thirdly, the obvious thing about ination is that with high ination,
even if their real income has kept constant or increased substantially, peo-
ple still feel being cheated and psychologically they regard ination as a
\bad thing" [Katona (1975)]. This psychological \irrationality" has been
proved again and again in experience. According to Katona (1980), in
America \there is no doubt that most people consider ination an evil.
In the late 1970s many more Americans said that ination was the most
serious problem confronting them. When asked which causes more serious
hardship, ination or unemployment, about two-thirds of the respondents
in 1979 named ination and one-fourth mentioned unemployment. This
despite the fact that ... very many Americans did not feel hurt by ina-
tion" (p.81). Recent experience in China provides alarming signal about
how dangerous the high ination would be, even accompanied by rapid
income growth in the decade of economic reforms. People suer most psy-
chologically from ination, and if the future is an ination world, there is
no way to stop people from discounting the future heavily.
To sum up, the assumption of time preference as a positive function
of expected ination is quite convincing to us. The only thing we feelINFLATION AVERSION 5
strange is why this ination aversion approach has not been widely used in
monetary growth and asset accumulation models.
3. THE INFLATION AVERSION MODEL AND ITS RESULTS
A representative family, whose size grows at natural rate n, maximizes







where c is per-capita consumption, m is per-capita real balances holding,
 is the expected ination rate, and  is the time preference generation
function of ination rate with following properties: 0 < min  () < 1,
0()  0; and 00() < 0; and there exists an ination rate such that  re-
tains its minimum min. The instantaneous utility function u is increasing,
concave, and continuously dierentiable in c and m, namely
uc > 0;um > 0;ucc < 0;umm < 0:
Output is produced by a standard neoclassical production function, f(k),
and k is per capita capital stock, and f0(k) > 0; f00(k) < 0.
There are two assets in the representative family's portfolios: money and
capital. The dynamic budget constraint for the family is
:
a = f(k) + x   c   nk   ( + n)m (2)
a = k + m (3)
where a is the total asset, and x is real transfer from the government; and
a dot over a variable denotes time derivative.
Under the budget constraints (2), (3), and the given initial capital stock
k(0) and m(0), the representative agent is to select the money holding path,
captal stock accumulation path, and the consumption level to maximize the
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dt = ((t))dt (4')










f(k) + x   c   nk   ( + n)m
()
(6)
Thus the optimization problem can be reduecd to maximize the function in
equation (5) subject to the constraints (6) and (3), with the initial capital
stock k(0) and real balances holding m(0) are given.





f(k) + x   c   nk   ( + n)m
()
+ 2(a   k   m) (7)
where 1 is the Hamilton multiplier associated with the equation (6), and
2 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the wealth constraint (3).
The necessary conditions for optimization are













= 1   2 (11)
and the transversality condition lim
!1
e ta1 = 0:
Substituting euqtions (8) and (9) into equations (10) and (11), and using
equation (4'), we get
um = uc(f0(k) + ) (12)
duc
dt
= uc(() + n   f0(k)) (13)INFLATION AVERSION 7
By the denition of the per-capita real balance, we get the accumulation
equations for the real balance
:





where  is the growth rate of nominal money supply, p is the price level.






Government revenue comes from money creation and makes transfer, x,
to the representative agent, so, we have
x = m (16)
Summarizing the discussion above, the full dynamics of the economy can
be described by
_ c =  
ucm
ucc









  f0(k)) + n   f0(k)] (17)
_ m = m(  
um
uc
+ f0(k)   n) (18)
_ k = f(k)   nk   c (19)
Using equations (17), (18), and (19), we can analyze the dynamic characters
of conusmption. capital stock, and the real balance, and from equation
(12), we can determine ination rate.
4. LONG-RUN EFFECTS
In this section, we analyze the long-run eects of money growth rate
on the economy1. The steady-state value (c;m;k) of consumption, real
balances, and the capital stock, reachs when _ c = _ m = _ k = 0; hence,
f0(k) = (   n) + n (20)
1Appendix A shows that the dynamic system of economy (17)-(19) is saddle-point
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um(c;m)
uc(c;m)
=  + f0(k)   n (21)
f(k)   nk   c = 0 (22)
Equation (20) says that optimal long-run capital is determined by equating
the marginal productivity of capital to the sum of discount rate and pop-
ulation growth; equation (21) is the optimal condition for money holding:
marginal rate of substitution between real balances and consumption is e-
qual to the ratio of the cost of money holding,  +f0(k) n = f0(k)+,
over the cost of consumption, which is one. Except for the dependence
of time preference on ination rate, all these steady state conditions are
identical to Sidrauski's (1967).








The reason is quite simple, high ination leads to more impatience, and
the representative family discounts further the future consumption and
increase its current consumption; in the end, saving and capital stock will
be reduced in the new equilibrium.
The eect of ination on long-run consumption is negative:
dc
d
= (f0(k)   n)
dk
d




Here we have used steady state condition (20) to get the second equality in
(24). The reason for this result is following: in the long run, optimal capital
stock is determined by the modied golden rule, and is less than the golden
rule level; and there does not exist dynamic ineciency (overaccumulation
of capital) in this economy. Hence any reduction in the capital stock caused
by ination leads to reduction in consumption.









uc(0(   n) + 1)
umm   ucm
(25)
Both terms on the right hand side of (25) are negative, for ucm is positive
and ucc, umm are negative. Real balances are reduced because money is
more costly to hold (substitution eect), and income is lower as a result of
reduced capital (income eect).
Therefore ination is an "evil" which brings about a high time discount
rate and low instantaneous utility by reducing both consumption and realINFLATION AVERSION 9
balances in the long run. if the government intends to maximize the steady
state welfare of the representative family, the simple rule is to choose an
ination rate which minimizes the time discount rate. In this case, Milton
Friedman's (1969) rule may not be right as consumption and capital accu-











If the minimum of time discount rate, min, is obtained before the dea-
tion rate reaches \ f0(k) ", it is still desirable to deate further following
Friedman's prescription,  =  (   n); the optimal growth rate of money
supply equals the inverse of time prefence.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We belive that ination aversion will be widely used in monetary e-
conomies and international nance.
APPENDIX A
The Stability of the Model
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and  = ( uc
ucc0 + ucm
ucc m) , J1 = umcuc umucc
u2
c ; and J2 = ummuc umucm
u2
c : It is
assumed that J1 > 0 and J2 < 0.
Denote the 33 matrix as A and denote the three characteristic roots as
1, 2 and 3. It is known that the product of the three characteristic roots
of the system is given by the determinant of matrix A, and the sum of the
three roots is given by the trace of A. We rst calculate the determinant
of A, det(A):
123 = det(A) = m
uc
ucc
f00(k)J2 < 0 (A.2)10 HENG-FU ZOU, LIUTANG GONG, AND XINSHENG ZENG
So the system has either one negative root or three negative roots. The
trace of A does not give us clear sign:
1 + 2 + 3 = tr(A) = J1   mJ2 +  (A.3)
where the second and the third terms on the right hand side are positive,
but the rst term is negative, given  < 0, J1 > 0 and J2 < 0:
We also know that the sum of the three second order principal minors






















This is because that the third term on the right hand side of the second
equality of (A.4) are negative, and the sum of the rst term and the second
term is also negative. To see the latter, the sum of these two terms is given
by
 mJ2 + J1 =
uc
ucc
0J1 + (J1   uccJ2=ucm)mucm=ucc (A.5)
In (A5), we only need to show that the term in the bracket is positive:




(umcucm   uccumm)uc > 0 (A.6)
From (A.2) and (A.4), it is very easy to see that there exist only one
negative root because the existence of three negative roots will contradict
(A.4). Our system has one state variable k and two jumping variables (c
and m), so there exists a unique perfect foresight path converging to the
steady state.
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